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Justice in the Jury: The Benefits of Allowing Felons to 




Imagine that you are incarcerated and on the verge of completing your 
sentence. You may be naturally inclined to believe that upon your release, 
you will re-enter society and be allowed to participate in basic rites of 
citizenship such as serving on a jury. While this seems like a reasonable 
assumption, in many places in America, you would be wrong. Under our 
current model of justice, a felony conviction or pleading carries with it 
consequences that can persist long after a felon cuts ties with the criminal 
justice system.1 In American law before the middle of the twentieth 
century, this was referred to as civil death.2 
Under common law civil death, any felony conviction carried with it 
the revocation of civil rights and exclusion from certain parts of society.3 
While civil death was a more formal process meant to signify that the 
person was dead to society, a remnant of the practice remains in our 
system today.4 Presently, civil death persists in the form of “collateral 
consequences” that deny felons the right to participate in certain civil 
privileges and processes.5 These consequences range from formal 
sanctions such as lack of voting rights and jury exclusion to less structured 
barriers like discrimination in hiring.6  
 
* J.D. (2018) Washington University School of Law.  
1. See Nora V. Demleitner, Preventing Internal Exile: The Need for Restrictions on Collateral 
Sentencing Consequences, 11 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 153, 153-54 (1999). 
2. Gabriel J. Chin, The New Civil Death: Rethinking Punishment in the Era of Mass Conviction, 
160 U. PENN. L. REV. 1789, 1790 (2012). 
3. Id. at 1793-94. In English common law, civil death consisted of:  
[A person being] placed in a state of attainder . . . and an extinction of civil rights, more or 
less complete, which was denominated civil death. Forfeiture was a part of the punishment of 
the crime . . . by which the goods and chattels, lands and tenements of the attainted felon were 
forfeited to the king . . . The blood of the attainted person was deemed to be corrupt . . . 
whereby . . . as stated by Chitty, “he is disqualified from being a witness, can bring no action, 
nor perform any legal function; he is in short regarded as dead in law.” 
Avery v. Everett, 18 N.E. 148, 150 (N.Y. 1888).  
4. Chin, supra note 2, at 1799.  
5. See Demleitner, supra note 1, at 153-54.  
6. Demleitner, supra note 1, at 156-59; see also MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: 
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While certain civil penalties, such as disenfranchisement, have 
garnered significant activism in attempts to restore former felons’ right to 
vote,7 the issue of jury exclusion is less controversial for many.8 Currently, 
thirty-one states and the federal government permanently exclude felons 
from serving on juries, whether civil or criminal.9 Because the criminal 
justice system currently confines a significant proportion of the African 
American population, this removes a large number of black males and 
females from the jury selection pool.10  
While certain policy reasons are asserted for why felons should not be 
allowed to serve on juries in criminal trials,11 social and political 
considerations merit an opposite argument. The criminal justice system 
has a history of jury bias and an underrepresentation of minorities in key 
decisions.12 Social science research has shown a tendency of white jurors 
to vote for a conviction of a black defendant in instances where a white 
defendant would be acquitted.13 White jurors are also more likely to 
impose harsher penalties on black defendants.14 Though there is an 
imperative for an increased presence of minorities on juries,15 black jurors 
who are eligible for the voir dire process are regularly turned away from 
 
MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS 142-43 (2012). 
7. See generally, Gabriel J. Chin, Felon Disenfranchisement and Democracy in the Late Jim 
Crow Era, 5 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 329 (2007)(discussing the history of felon disenfranchisement and 
how this mirrors historical policies of racial exclusion of blacks). 
8. See James Michael Binnall, A Jury of None: An Essay on the Last Acceptable Form of Civic 
Banishment, 34 DIALECT ANTHROPOLOGY 533 (2010); see infra notes 82-83 and accompanying text.  
9. Brian C. Kalt, The Exclusion of Felons from Jury Service, 53 AM. U. L. REV. 65, 150-58 
(2003). 
10. See ALEXANDER, supra note 6, at 6-7. “One in six black men had been incarcerated as of 
2001. If current trends continue, one in three black males born today can expect to spend time in 
prison during his lifetime.” Criminal Justice Fact Sheet, NAACP, http://www.naacp.org/criminal-
justice-fact-sheet/ (last visited Nov. 18, 2016). 
11. See Kalt, supra note 9, at 100-13. 
12. See generally Sherri Lynn Johnson, Black Innocence and the White Jury, 83 MICH. L. REV. 
1611 (1985) (exploring the extent of jury bias in criminal trials and presenting ways to include more 
minorities on juries). 
13. Id. at 1619-22. 
14. Id. at 1622-23. See also DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., Facts About the Death Penalty, DEATH 
PENALTY INFO (Nov. 17, 2016), http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/documents/FactSheet.pdf (citing a 
study that found that “[j]urors in Washington state are three times more likely to recommend a death 
sentence for a black defendant than for a white defendant in a similar case.”). 
15. See Anna Roberts, (Re)forming the Jury: Detection and Disinfection of Implicit Juror Bias, 44 
CONN. L. REV. 827, 880-81 (2012).  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol57/iss1/17
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service through the use of measures like prosecutorial discretion and 
peremptory challenges.16 With obvious juror racial bias against blacks and 
purposeful attempts to exclude blacks from jury service, there is an 
increasing need to enlarge the pool of citizens who are eligible for jury 
service. 
An abundant supply of jurors, particularly blacks, can be created by 
removing barriers to jury inclusion and allowing felons to participate in 
the process.17 Jury service should be open to felony offenders who have 
completed their sentence and desire to civically engage with society. They 
should be able to participate in voir dire in a manner similar to other 
citizens but with special safeguards against prosecutorial bias.18  
This Note will trace the history behind jury bias, the exclusion of black 
jurors, the need to enhance opportunities for blacks to serve on juries, and 
how this relates to allowing felons to participate in the jury process. 
Part I of the Note will begin with a discussion on the history of jury 
service in our nation, starting with the Sixth Amendment promise that 
every accused person has a right to a jury19 and adding to it the idea of a 
jury drawn from a cross-section of one’s peers.20 This part will also 
present evidence of jury bias regarding minorities, how this is affected by 
disproportionate jury composition, and systemic factors that perpetuate the 
underrepresentation of minorities on juries.21  
Part II will analyze the effects of relevant laws and case history that 
 
16. See Sherri Lynn Johnson, The Language and Culture (Not to Say Race) of Peremptory 
Challenges, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 21 (1993). 
17. See Kalt, supra note 9, at 160-61. 
18. Kalt, supra note 9, at 160-61. 
19. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The Sixth Amendment reads:  
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by 
an impartial jury of the state and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which 
district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and 
cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory 
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the assistance of counsel for his 
defense.  
Id.  
20. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 528 (1975). “[T]he number of persons on the jury should 
‘be large enough to promote group deliberation, free from outside attempts at intimidation, and to 
provide a fair possibility for obtaining a representative cross-section of the community.’” Id. (quoting 
Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 100 (1970)). 
21. See Johnson, supra note 12. 
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have developed in this area. It will first consider the costs to society of 
continuing felon exclusion and weigh these detriments against the 
potential benefits of reform that would allow felon inclusion. This part 
will also rebut concerns associated with inclusion by presenting evidence 
that felons on juries can be unbiased and participate in a manner similar to 
other citizens.  
Part III will argue that criminal rehabilitation, civic participation, and 
the integrity of the jury is best served by including felons on juries in 
criminal cases. It will present the idea of including offenders in the process 
of voir dire and letting prosecutors select or deny a person because of their 




A. The Jury as an Institution 
 
The American jury system has distinguished itself from other judicial 
systems with a unique set of promises and systems for those who face 
criminal prosecution.22 The Sixth Amendment guarantees the rights of 
criminal defendants, including the right to an impartial jury.23 Scholars, 
both American and foreign, have championed the jury system as being a 
vital part of democracy designed to give heightened protection to the 
accused.24 Justice Breyer even commended the criminal jury as the 
“conscience of the community” because the jury is more apt to represent 
the will of the people and community more than a single judge.25 
 
22. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 152-58 (1968) (describing the development of the 
jury in America and its pivotal role in protecting the rights of men from oppressive forces). 
23. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
24. See Honorable William G. Young, Vanishing Trials, Vanishing Juries, Vanishing 
Constitution, 40 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 67 (2006). 
25. Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 615-16 (2002)(Breyer, J., concurring). Breyer uses this phrase 
as part of his explanation for why juries are more equipped to impose the death penalty than a sole 
judge. Quoting several precedent cases, he writes:  
 
In respect to retribution, jurors possess an important comparative advantage over judges. In 
principle, they are more attuned to “the community's moral sensibility,” because they “reflect 
more accurately the composition and experiences of the community as a whole . . . .” Hence 
they are more likely to “express the conscience of the community on the ultimate question of 
life or death . . . .”  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol57/iss1/17
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B. The Cross-Section Requirement 
 
Because the jury serves an important role in criminal verdicts and 
sentencing, the composition of a jury is of the utmost importance to a 
defendant.26 In Taylor v. Louisiana, the Supreme Court addressed the issue 
of whether defendants in a criminal trial are entitled to a fair and 
representative jury and what this means for jury selection and 
composition.27 Drawing on its precedent from 1940 forward, the Court 
declared, “the selection of a petit jury28 from a representative cross section 
of the community is an essential component of the Sixth Amendment right 
to a jury trial.”29 A cross-section of the community is key to criminal trials 
because a jury composed from various geographical areas and racial 
groups is better equipped to judge the gravity of community members’ 
actions, more impartial to the defendant, and consistent with each citizen’s 
duty and right to participate in the civil process.30 
To challenge whether a cross-section of the community exists within a 
jury, the court articulated a test in Duren v. Missouri.31 The defendant 
must show that (1) a group qualifying as distinctive, (2) is not fairly and 
reasonably represented in jury venires,32 and (3) “systematic exclusion” in 
 
Id. (quoting Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 481 (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part) and Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 519 (1968)). 
26. See generally Johnson, supra note 12 (describing the ways white juror bias has affected black 
defendants and highlighting how this has compromised the promises of justice for people of color). 
27. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 526-30 (1975).  
28. The term “petit jury” refers to a trial jury that is chosen to decide whether a defendant 
committed the crime as charged in a criminal case. This is in comparison to a grand jury that simply 
“determines whether there is ‘probable cause’ to believe the individual has committed a crime and 
should be put on trial.” Types of Juries, UNITED STATES COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/services-
forms/jury-service/types-juries (last visited Jan. 9, 2018). 
29. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 528 (1975); see also 28 U.S.C.A. § 1861 (West 2016). 
30. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 530-31 (1975). Restricting jury service to only special 
groups or excluding identifiable segments playing major roles in the community cannot be squared 
with the constitutional concept of a jury trial. The Court emphasizes that: 
Trial by jury presupposes a jury drawn from a pool broadly representative of the community 
as well as impartial in a specific case. . . . [The] broad representative character of the jury 
should be maintained, partly as assurance of a diffused impartiality and partly because sharing 
in the administration of justice is a phase of civic responsibility. 
Id. (quoting Thiel v. Southern Pacific Co., 328 U.S. 217, 227 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)).  
31. Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357 (1979). 
32. A venire panel is a group of prospective jurors summoned by the court. Venire, CORNELL 
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the jury-selection process accounts for the underrepresentation.33 For the 
purposes of race, a defendant could show a lack of a fair cross-section 
through the use of statistical data comparing the composition of the venire 
panel to the makeup of the local community.34 If a large disparity is 
apparent and the group has been systematically excluded, a court may find 
that the system denied the defendant the opportunity to a fair trial by 
jury.35 Difficulty often arises, however, when defendants attempt to prove 
systematic exclusion among jurors.36 The Court has given “broad 
discretion” to states to “prescribe relevant qualifications for their jurors 
and to provide reasonable exemptions.”37 Practically, this creates 
difficulties for defendants who cite hidden bias and other indirect methods 
of discrimination in jury selection.38 These barriers to proving bias in 
composition and jury impartiality can be detrimental to a black 
defendant’s argument that a majority white jury was biased in his 
proceeding.39 
 
LAW SCHOOL LEGAL INFORMATION INSTITUTE, https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/venire (last visited 
Jan. 9, 2018). 
33. Id. at 364. The full text of the opinion states:  
In order to establish a prima facie violation of the fair-cross-section requirement, the 
defendant must show (1) that the group alleged to be excluded is a "distinctive" group in the 
community; (2) that the representation of this group in venires from which juries are selected 
is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the community; and (3) 
that this underrepresentation is due to systematic exclusion of the group in the jury-selection 
process.  
Id. 
34. See Berghuis v. Smith, 559 U.S. 314, 330-31 (2010). 
35. Id. at 531.  
36. See id. 
37. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 537-38(1975).  
38. See Berghuis v. Smith, 559 U.S. 314, 332 (2010). The defendant in Berghuis argued that the 
county systematically excluded blacks through county administrative methods:  
The County's practice of excusing people who merely alleged hardship or simply failed to 
show up for jury service, its reliance on mail notices, its failure to follow up on nonresponses, 
its use of residential addresses at least 15 months old, and the refusal of Kent County police to 
enforce court orders for the appearance of prospective jurors.  
Id. The Court rejected the argument that these practices constituted sufficient proof of 
systemic exclusion, especially in light of state sovereignty in its procedures and jury 
requirements. Id. 
39. See generally Johnson, supra note 12 (discussing the inefficacy of various techniques in 
eliminating racial bias in criminal trials). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol57/iss1/17
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C. Jury Bias 
 
Although the Supreme Court and certain judges dispute whether a 
juror’s race can affect jury decisions,40 social science research shows a 
correlation between jury composition and sentencing of minority 
defendants.41 Judges have hesitated to link discrimination to disparate 
outcomes because they want to avoid releasing a defendant they believe to 
be dangerous, are unable to imagine the effects an alternate juror may have 
had on the proceedings, or believe that it is unconstitutional or unwise to 
admit the effect juror race can have on verdicts.42 Yet, studies have shown 
that race can affect outcomes in some cases and that judges have the 
ability to estimate the effect of race.43 
Case studies, conviction rates, death penalty statistics, mock jury 
findings, and research on racial prejudice can be used to paint a picture of 
jury bias against black defendants by white juries.44 Although each of the 
different types of data alone are incomplete and open to challenge, taken 
collectively, they paint a picture of juror bias based on race.45 In studies on 
conviction rates, significant differences were found between jury guilty 
verdicts for black defendants and their white counterparts; this was true for 
majority white juries and also white and black judges.46 For example, one 
study produced statistics showing that juries that have a larger number of 
blacks produce lower conviction rates than juries that are majority white.47 
 
40. See Nancy J. King, Postconviction Review of Jury Discrimination: Measuring the Effects of 
Juror Race on Jury Decisions, 92 MICH. L. REV. 63 (1993). 
41. Id. at 99-100. The article describes the debate over juror discrimination and its effect on 
decisions. It outlines the argument that discrimination exists in such a way that judges have the ability 
to predict it and act in ways to counter its potential effects on defendants. Id. at 103-04. 
42. Id. at 76. The author makes the argument that because of this reluctance by judges to view the 
situation in a more objective manner, they are unable to see the picture for what it clearly is: juror race 
and subsequent discrimination on defendants does have an effect on trial outcomes. Researchers are 
more able to ascertain this truth because they operate without the hesitation of judges mentioned 
above. Id. 
43. Id. at 77. 
44. See Johnson, supra note 12, at 1617-51; Roberts, supra note 15, at 835-37; King, supra note 
40, at 77-100. 
45. See Johnson, supra note 12, at 1617-51.  
46. Johnson, supra note 12, at 1620-21.  
47. Johnson, supra note 12, at 1620-21. In studies in both Baltimore and Los Angeles, 
experimentation with jury selection procedures produced significant differences in conviction rates. In 
Baltimore, one jury method yielded 70% whites and another method yielded 34%-47% blacks and the 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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On an individual level, lab studies of jury behavior showed that among 
both white and black jurors, each person was more likely to assign 
culpability to a person of a race other than his own.48  
In addition to these overt patterns in juror behavior, research on racial 
stereotypes supports the idea of racial bias and provides a partial 
explanation for the phenomena described above.49 One study highlights 
several stereotypes of blacks being associated with lower social and 
socioeconomic status, negative moral and personal traits, and 
untrustworthiness, including a higher propensity for violence, criminality, 
and culpability.50 Even if a juror believes he or she is racially neutral and 
does not intend to stereotype or categorize a black defendant, implicit bias 
has been observed in participants at every level of criminal proceedings, 
including judges and attorneys.51 With white jurors, this means that black 
defendants could be convicted on the basis of a subconscious bias 
 
conviction rate differed from 84% to less than 74%. Similarly, in Los Angeles, when the city included 
more black and Hispanic jurors, the conviction rate fell from 67% in 1969 to 47.2% in 1971. Johnson, 
supra note 12, at 1621-22. 
48. Johnson, supra note 12, at 1625-34. In this study, black jurors were likely to assign less 
culpability to black defendants and more to white defendants. White jurors behaved in a similar 
manner by determining black guilt at a rate higher than that of white guilt. Johnson, supra note 12, at 
1625-34. 
49. See Johnson, supra note 12, at 1617-51. 
50. Johnson, supra note 12, at 1649. The article goes on to distinguish between people that overtly 
express negative stereotypes and those that internalize them but nonetheless act in a biased manner 
because of them.  
Dominative racists express their bigoted beliefs openly, frequently through physical force, 
while aversive racists do not want to associate with blacks but do not often express this 
feeling. Social scientists once described the aversive mode as characterizing the North and the 
dominative mode as characterizing the South, but now suggest that aversive manifestations of 
racism increasingly predominate in all parts of the country.  
Johnson, supra note 12, at 1649. 
51. Roberts, supra note 15, at 835-37. According to the article, implicit bias in criminal 
proceedings can do the following:  
Affect how jurors react to assertions that someone acted in self-defense[;] assertions that there 
was excessive force by the police[;] affect whether there really is a presumption of innocence 
. . . [;]whether the jury believes that remaining silent, which is a defendant's constitutional 
right, is an admission of guilt[;] and how the jury perceives an expert witness who is a person 
of color. 
Roberts, supra note 15, at 837. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol57/iss1/17
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triggered by implicit negative associations or prior experiences.52 
Combining the high potential for jury bias with the large number of 
minorities in the criminal justice system, it is imperative that black 
defendants, who have a right to a jury composed of a cross-section of their 
peers, have more blacks on a jury to prevent bias and provide a fair trial.53  
It is estimated that the criminal justice system currently incarcerates or 
supervises over thirteen million Americans, four or five million of whom 
are black. This signifies that “16% to 21% of the adult black population 
are felons, and that between 29% and 37% of the adult black male 
population are felons.”54 Though a disproportionate number of blacks are 
currently under the supervision of the criminal justice system,55 and many 
black defendants have been subject to jury trials, a jury’s composition is 
not always reflective of the black populace in that community.56  
 
D. The State’s Role in Creating Disproportionate Juries 
 
Since the advent of slavery in America, state and federal governments 
have erected barriers at multiple levels of the criminal justice system to 
prevent black citizens from exercising their right to serve on a jury.57 
Reconstruction laws explicitly excluding blacks from juries were officially 
struck down by the Supreme Court in its 1880 decision Strauder v. West 
 
52. See Johnson, supra note 12, at 1650-51. 
53. See Johnson, supra note 12, at 1696-99. 
54. Kalt, supra note 9, at 170 (citing Christopher Uggen et al., Crime, Class, and Reintegration: 
The Scope and Social Distribution of America’s Criminal Class, Paper Delivered to the American 
Society of Criminology 17, Nov. 18, 2000). The authors of this paper compiled these numbers by 
starting with the number of each year’s cohort of released felons, subtracting the estimated number of 
recidivists and death, and aggregating the cohort into a grand total. The federal government has a 
different view of these numbers and estimates that the number “in jail, in prison, on parole, or on 
probation—a count that includes misdemeanants—in 2001 at 6.6 million.” Kalt, supra note 9, at 170 
n.498 (citing Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Sourcebook of Criminal Justice 
Statistics 2001, at 494 tbl. 6.23 (2002)) (providing incarceration rates from 1925 to 2001).   
55. See Kalt, supra note 9, at 170. The term supervision includes statistics of those currently 
incarcerated, those released on parole, and those on probation. Kalt, supra note 9, at 170 n. 498. 
56. See ALEXANDER, supra note 6, at 193-94; Adam Liptak, Exclusion of Blacks From Juries 
Raises Renewed Scrutiny, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 16, 2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/17/us/politics/exclus 
ion-of-blacks-from-juries-raises-renewed-scrutiny.html?_r=0. 
57. See ALEXANDER, supra note 6, at 119-23.  
Washington University Open Scholarship










234 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 57:225 
 
 
Virginia.58 Yet, de facto exclusion of blacks from jury service continued 
through the use of intimidation, local discretionary policies, and other 
barriers to black jury participation.59 Furthermore, despite its ruling in 
Strauder that a defendant of one race should not have to face a panel of 
jurors from which his race has purposefully been excluded,60 the Supreme 
Court consistently upheld convictions of black defendants by all-white 
juries.61 The Court reasoned that explicit exclusion of a particular group 
violates equal protection, however, “the Court allowed states to 
discriminate in selecting juries by de facto means, such that states could 
discriminate as to who could serve on a jury in a manner that would 
adversely affect African Americans, without violating the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”62 
One of the most pervasive sources for state exclusion of jurors is 
prosecutorial discretion in jury selection and peremptory strike.63 In Swain 
 
58. Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 308-09 (1880) (stating that the exclusion of blacks 
from jury service was “practically a brand upon them, affixed by law, an assertion of their inferiority, 
and a stimulant to that race prejudice which is an impediment to . . . equal justice”). 
59. Gunnar Myrdal describes the use of intimidation in the Jim Crow South:  
If there is a deficiency of legal protection for Negroes, white people will be tempted to deal 
unfairly with them in everyday affairs. They will be tempted to use irregular methods to 
safeguard what they feel to be their interests against Negroes. They will be inclined to use 
intimidation and even violence against Negroes if they can count on going unpunished. When 
such patterns become established, the law itself and its processes are brought into contempt, 
and a general feeling of uncertainty, arbitrariness and inequality will spread.  
GUNNAR MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA 524 (1944). Potential black jurors were and continue to 
be excluded through means such as carefully drawn jury pools and selective procedures for how 
summonses are issued, such as issuing them only to registered voters or citizens with driver’s licenses. 
ALEXANDER, supra note 6, at 121. 
60. Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 309 (1880) (asking “[h]ow can it be maintained that 
compelling a colored man to submit to a trial for his life by a jury drawn from a panel from which the 
State has expressly excluded every man of his race, because of his color alone, however well qualified 
in other respects, is not a denial to him of equal protection?”) 
61. See ALEXANDER, supra note 6, at 120; Benno C. Schmidt, Jr., Juries, Jurisdiction, and Race 
Discrimination: The Lost Promise of Strauder v. West Virginia, 61 TEX. L. REV. 1401 (1983). 
62. Amanda L. Kutz, A Jury of One's Peers: Virginia's Restoration of Rights Process and Its 
Disproportionate Effect on the African American Community, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2109, 2118 
(2005). 
63. See ALEXANDER, supra note 6 at 121; Lance Salyers, Invaluable Tool vs. Unfair Use of 
Private Information: Examining Prosecutors' Use of Jurors' Criminal History Records in Voir Dire, 
56 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1079 (1999)(discussing prosecutors’ use of criminal records to attack 
prospective jurors during voir dire). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol57/iss1/17
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v. Alabama, the Supreme Court upheld the right of prosecutors to strike 
black jurors for “acceptable considerations” as long as the prosecutor did 
not systematically strike blacks from every trial.64 “Over the next twenty 
years, no lower court found that the Swain standard had been satisfied.”65 
Courts denied claims based on evidence of prosecutors repeatedly striking 
black jurors and deemed it “inappropriate to present as evidence only 
those cases involving black defendants.”66 Under this framework, the 
justice system didn’t acknowledge the violation of black defendants’ rights 
under the Equal Protection Clause because of racial discrimination in jury 
selection.67 There was even less recognition of the manner in which jurors’ 
rights were violated by such discrimination.68  
The Supreme Court finally revisited the issue of prosecutors’ 
discriminatory use of peremptory strikes in the case Batson v. Kentucky.69 
In Batson, a black defendant appealed his conviction, challenging the 
prosecutor’s use of peremptory strikes against all of the black prospective 
jurors.70 Revisiting the premise of Strauder,71 the Court declared that 
prosecutors are forbidden from challenging prospective jurors solely on 
the basis of his or her race or the assumption that a black juror would not 
be impartial to the State’s case.72 The Court also created a framework for a 
 
64. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 221-23 (1965)(stating that “[w]e cannot hold that the 
striking of Negroes in a particular case is a denial of equal protection of the laws. In the quest for an 
impartial and qualified jury, Negro and white, Protestant and Catholic, are alike subject to being 
challenged without cause. To subject the prosecutor's challenge in any particular case to the demands 
and traditional standards of the Equal Protection Clause would entail a radical change in the nature and 
operation of the challenge.”).  
65. Johnson, supra note 16, at 28. 
66. Johnson, supra note 16, at 29; Johnson, supra note 12, at 1658. 
67. See Johnson, supra note 12, at 1658-59. 
68. See Barbara D. Underwood, Ending Race Discrimination in Jury Selection: Whose Right Is It, 
Anyway?, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 725 (1992)(noting that many challenges to discrimination in the use of 
peremptory strikes are viewed through the lens of the criminal defendant, but little attention is given to 
the right of the juror being excluded). 
69. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986). 
70. Id. at 82. The defense moved to discharge the jury on the grounds that the removal of all 
blacks violated the defendant’s Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment right to a jury drawn from a cross 
section of the community. The judge denied the motion, stating that “the parties were entitled to use 
their peremptory challenges to ‘strike anybody they want to.’” Id. at 83. 
71. See supra notes 58-60 and accompanying text.   
72. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 89 (1986).The Court went on to state the following: “[T]he 
harm from discriminatory jury selection extends beyond that inflicted on the defendant and the 
excluded juror to touch the entire community. Selection procedures that purposefully exclude black 
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defendant to establish a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination in 
the selection of the jury.73 Despite the solidification of this safeguard, 
prosecutors continued to use peremptory strikes in a discriminatory 
manner but passed the Batson test by providing race-neutral 
explanations.74 In Purkett v. Elem,75 the Court took its lenient approach to 
prosecutor discretion even further by ruling that the prosecutor’s reason 
for striking a juror does not have to be “persuasive, or even plausible,” as 
long as no “discriminatory intent is inherent in the prosecutor's 
explanation, the reason offered will be deemed race neutral.”76  
 
E. The Exclusion of Felons 
 
In addition to de facto exclusion of minorities from the jury pool, many 
modern day laws limit or forbid the inclusion of former felons on juries, 
 
persons from juries undermine public confidence in the fairness of our system of justice.” Id. at 87. 
73. Id. at 96. The Court articulated the standard as follows: 
[T]he defendant first must show that he is a member of a cognizable racial group, and that the 
prosecutor has exercised peremptory challenges to remove from the venire members of the 
defendant's race. Second, the defendant is entitled to rely on the fact, as to which there can be 
no dispute, that peremptory challenges constitute a jury selection practice that permits ‘those 
to discriminate who are of a mind to discriminate.’ Finally, the defendant must show that 
these facts and any other relevant circumstances raise an inference that the prosecutor used 
that practice to exclude the veniremen from the petit jury on account of their race.  
Id. 
74. ALEXANDER, supra note 6, at 121. Alexander notes the following: 
[C]ourts accept explanations that jurors are too young, too old, too conservative, too liberal, 
too comfortable, or too uncomfortable . . . . Even explanations that might correlate with race, 
such as lack of education, unemployment, poverty, being single, living in the same 
neighborhood as the defendant, or proof of involvement with the criminal justice system—
have all been accepted as perfectly good, non-pretextual excuses for striking African 
Americans from juries. 
ALEXANDER, supra note 6, at 121-22. 
75. Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765 (1995). 
76. Id. at 768. ALEXANDER, supra note 6 at 122-23. See also Illegal Racial Discrimination in Jury 
Selection: A Continuing Legacy, EQUAL JUSTICE INITIATIVE 16-17 (2010), http://eji.org/sites/default/fi 
les/illegal-racial-discrimination-in-jury-selection.pdf. (describing some race-neutral reasons to 
exclude: low intelligence, low education, receives food stamps, from a high crime area, and having a 
child out of wedlock). Despite the fact that many of these reasons can be correlated with minority 
status, judges have upheld them in the past. Id. 
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eliminating a large number of blacks that have the potential to serve.77 
There are two main approaches to jury exclusion: either a lifetime ban, or 
restoration at some point and under particular circumstances.78 Thirty-one 
states and the federal system currently have a lifetime ban for convicted 
felons.79  
Ten states . . . exclude felons during the time that they are under 
sentence, under the supervision of the criminal justice system, or in 
prison;” three states “allow parties to challenge felons for cause for life at 
the discretion of the court;” five states “provide hybrids of various 
severity, either providing different rules for different situations, or using a 
rule combining penal status and some term of years;” and two states place 
no restrictions on felon jury service. Hence, while divergent statutory 
schemes comprise a “patchwork” of standards, an overwhelming majority 
of jurisdictions banish felonious jurors for life.80 
With the majority of jurisdictions permanently removing felons’ right 
to participate in the jury process, several policy reasons have been offered 
as justifications for sustaining the prohibition.81 
 
F. Rationale for Exclusion 
 
Brian Kalt describes the four main policy reasons for felon exclusion 
from juries as “history, maintaining probity, maintaining impartiality, and 
reliance on the clemency process.”82 Jury exclusion is a long-standing 
tradition in the history of our country and European predecessors, with 
exclusion occurring formally since 1410 and informally for centuries 
longer.83 Despite the persistence of the tradition, modern changes in 
 
77. Kalt, supra note 9, at 67. “Thirteen million people, including about thirty percent of black 
men, are banned for life from jury service because they are felons.” Kalt, supra note 9, at 67; see also 
Am. Bar Ass’n, Standards on Collateral Sanctions and Discretionary Disqualification of Convicted 
Persons, 9 n. 6 (2013), 
http://www.americanbar.org/publications/criminal_justice_section_archive/crimjust_stan 
dards_collateral_toc.html. 
78. James M. Binnall, Convicts in Court: Felonious Lawyers Make a Case for Including 
Convicted Felons in the Jury Pool, 73 ALB. L. REV. 1379, 1385 (2010). 
79. Id.  
80. Id. (quoting Kalt, supra note 9, at 150-58). 
81. See Binnall, supra note 78 at 1385-86; Kalt, supra note 9, at 100-13. 
82. Kalt, supra note 9, at 100. 
83. Kalt, supra note 9, at 100-01. “For grand juries, felon exclusion dates back to the Assize of 
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expectations for jury composition and the relevant felon population 
challenge the practice’s contemporary viability.84 For example, jury 
participation has broadened since the establishment of jury exclusion in 
America, evolving to include women, minorities, and other populations 
that were historically foreclosed from the process.85 Also, while felon 
exclusion centuries ago was exercised within a criminal justice system that 
only incarcerated a small number of persons, the modern-day explosion of 
the prison population affects a larger number of American citizens.86 
These political and social developments surrounding juror exclusion 
suggest that the system has changed over time, and the rationale that 
history begets best practice is no longer sufficient to continue to exclude 
felons.87 
The main justification for excluding jurors is that former criminals will 
affect the probity of the jury, either because the individuals themselves are 
“bad” or the stigma associated with their status will taint the integrity of 
the jury.88 This rationale is flawed: the system does not protect probity by 
excluding felons when the participation of non-felons on juries has similar 
potential to taint the process.89 The probity argument also naturally relies 
on blind assumptions. One assumption is that it equates a felony 
conviction with a sign of an intrinsic character flaw.90 It also relies on the 
 
Clarendon in 1166 and, in more specific form, to a 1410 statute of Henry IV.” Kalt, supra note 9, at 
100-01. 
84. Kalt, supra note 9, 100-02. 
85. Kalt, supra note 9, 100-01.  
86. Kalt, supra note 9, at 101-02. 
87. Kalt, supra note 9, at 100-02. Oliver Wendell Holmes said:  
It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that so it was laid down in the 
time of Henry IV. It is still more revolting if the grounds upon which it was laid down have 
vanished long since, and the rule simply persists from blind imitation of the past. After all, 
one could argue just as easily for the exclusion of female jurors because a jury has always 
meant “twelve good men and true.” Indeed, women were not allowed to serve as jurors in 
every state until 1966, which was decades after women achieved suffrage. But women's place 
in America has changed, as have the places of juries and felons. 
Kalt, supra note 9, at 100-02; See also MICHELLE ALEXANDER, supra note 6. 
88. Kalt, supra note 9, at 100-02; see also United States v. Foxworth, 599 F.2d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 1979) 
(holding that felon exclusion “is intended to assure the ‘probity’ of the jury” is rationally based). 
89. Kalt, supra note 9, at 103-04. 
90. Paula Z. Segal, A More Inclusive Democracy: Challenging Felon Jury Exclusion in New York, 
13 N.Y. CITY L. REV. 313, 355-56 (2010). 
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assumption that a person’s character will never change, and that good 
character is a requirement for understanding the public good.91  
A parallel justification for felon exclusion is that former felons would 
have a tendency to be biased in the decision-making process, and would 
distort jury deliberations and verdicts.92 The felon will either be hostile 
toward the government and side with defendants, or be antagonistic to the 
system that had convicted them and therefore be resistant to sentencing 
others to a similar fate.93 To prevent such bias altogether, the system 
automatically excludes all felons, but it does not handle other potentially 
biased persons in a similar manner.94 Victims of crime and their family 
members, for instance, have a tendency to be more biased toward criminal 
defendants, especially when the crime is similar to what happened to them, 
but these prospective jurors are not unilaterally excluded. They are 
handled on a case-by-case basis through the use of voir dire, the judge 
removing them for cause, or a prosecutor using a peremptory strike.95 If 
other potentially biased citizens are allowed to go through the jury 
selection process and be screened out, former felons should be treated 
similarly. This is especially true because the policy operates on an 
assumption that may be inaccurate: all felons are not inherently biased.96 
There are examples of felons actually being partial to the government’s 
case in a criminal trial, wanting to please the prosecutor if the person is on 
parole or probation, having a jaded perspective on actual innocence, or 
enacting a desire to prove himself as impartial.97 
Those who recognize some of these inconsistencies acknowledge 
certain felons may deserve to serve on a criminal jury, but they believe 
that the clemency process is better equipped to deal with this than blanket 
inclusion of all former felons.98 Under the clemency argument, those 
 
91. Id. 
92. Kalt, supra note 9, at 105-08; see also United States v. Greene, 995 F.2d 793, 797 (8th Cir. 
1993) (holding that having jurors with a history of criminal charges is “‘incompatible with [the] 
significant [governmental] interest,’ of having jurors who ‘can conscientiously and properly carry out 
their sworn duty to apply the law to the facts of the particular case.’”).  
93. Kalt, supra note 9, at 105-08. 
94. Kalt, supra note 9, at 105-08. 
95. Segal, supra note 90, at 355. 
96. Kalt, supra note 9, at 106.  
97. Kalt, supra note 9, at 106. 
98. Kalt, supra note 9, at 108-10.  
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felons who desire to serve on a jury can use their state’s process to apply 
for a special exception. This would allow the most adamant and deserving 
felons the opportunity to attempt voir dire, but would continue to exclude 
the majority of offenders that may not be fit for service because of a 
number of factors mentioned above.99 The issue with this approach, 
however, is that the clemency process is difficult to navigate so that only a 
small number of former felons actually utilize it, and of those who do, an 
even smaller number actually have their requests granted.100 Kalt opines 
that because of these persistent difficulties, in lieu of allowing individuals 
to obtain clemency, former felons should not be subject to blanket 
exclusion at all.101 
 
G. Rulings and Findings on Felon Exclusion 
 
Several court decisions and a presidential commission have also 
acknowledged that felons are not inherently biased or unfit to be included 
on juries. In Miller,102 Boney,103 and Humphreys,104 courts upheld 
convictions of criminal defendants who contested their jury verdicts 
because of the presence of felons.105 The courts relied on precedent106 to 
hold that convictions should only be overturned if there is evidence of 
juror bias or lack of an impartial jury.107 One decision espoused the view 
 
99. Kalt, supra note 9, at 108-10. 
100. Kalt, supra note 9, at 108-10. 
101. Kalt, supra note 9, at 108-10. 
102. People v. Miller, 759 N.W.2d 850 (Mich. Sup. Ct. 2008). 
103. United States v. Boney, 977 F.2d 624 (D.C. Cir. 1992). 
104. United States v. Humphreys, 982 F.2d 254 (8th Cir. 1992). 
105. The federal law applied in Boney and Humphreys required that in order to exclude felons, 
defendants must affirmatively invoke the right. United States v. Boney, 977 F.2d 624, 633 (D.C. Cir. 
1992) (quoting United States v. Uribe, 890 F.2d 554, 561 (1st Cir. 1989)). The defendant would have 
to make this assertion either before voir dire or within seven days of discovery of the grounds for the 
assertion. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1867 (West 2016). In Miller, the defendant asserted that the felon juror was 
prejudiced against him. 759 N.W.2d 850, 853 (Mich. Sup. Ct. 2008). In Boney, the defendant argued 
that the felon on his jury created an impartial panel in violation of the Sixth Amendment. 977 F.2d 
624, 628 (D.C. Cir. 1992). In Humphreys, the defendant asserted that the selection process was 
improper because jurors were supposed to be excluded under federal law. 982 F.2d 254, 260-61 (8th 
Cir. 1992). 
106. McDonough Power Equipment, Inc. v. Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548, 554 (1984). 
107. United States v. Boney, 977 F.2d 624, 632 (D.C. Cir. 1992); People v. Miller, 759 N.W.2d 
850, 856-57 (2008).  
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that “felon status, alone, does not necessarily imply bias,”108 and the other 
cases found that the former felons did not exhibit bias or partiality.109 
In a 1967 report, a presidential commission found that there was little 
reason to permanently disqualify all felons from jury service.110 Instead, 
the report espoused several different approaches that jurisdictions could 
take to integrate felons into the jury process.111 The main recommendation 
was that the parties and judge in the case should control felon exclusion 
since they are in the best position to evaluate the potential jurors’ 
fitness.112 The judge could have discretion to bar a felon based on his 
conviction’s connection to the case, and legislatures could also have the 
power to prescribe certain convictions as grounds for dismissing a juror.113 
The commission hoped that by utilizing some or a combination of these 





Combining the intended purpose of the jury with the current judicial 
and social context, the benefits versus harm of including felons in the jury 
pool become apparent. Felon exclusion harms criminal defendants, the 
integrity of the jury, and the criminal justice system.115 While felon 
inclusion presents notable benefits for the latter and has the potential to 
 
108. United States v. Boney, 977 F.2d 624, 633 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (declaring that “the Sixth 
Amendment right to an impartial jury similarly does not require an absolute bar on felon-jurors”). 
109. People v. Miller, 759 N.W.2d 850, 860 (Mich. Sup. Ct. 2008) (finding that a juror’s felon 
status did not affect his deliberations and he did not try to improperly influence other jurors); United 
States v. Humphreys, 982 F.2d 254, 261 (8th Cir. 1992) (holding that “there was no evidence of either 
bias or unfairness as a result of the seating of this juror.”). 
110. Kalt, supra note 9, at 142-43 (citing Task Force on Corrections, The President’s Comm’n 
on Law Enforcement and Admin. of Justice, Task Force Report: Corrections 91 (1967)). 
111. Kalt, supra note 9, at 142-43. 
112. Kalt, supra note 9, at 142-43 Another recommendation suggested that legislatures could 
create disqualification for certain offenses for a set number of years. Kalt, supra note 9, at 142-43 
113. Kalt, supra note 9, at 142-43 
114. Kalt, supra note 9, at 142 n.346 (describing the Commission’s purpose as “analyzing the 
American corrections system in 1967 and recommending future changes”). 
115. See generally Anna Roberts, Casual Ostracism: Jury Exclusion on the Basis of Criminal 
Convictions, 98 MINN. L. REV. 592 (2013)(discussing the harms of felon exclusion and justifications 
for modifying the system to include felons). 
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strengthen both the black community and society in general.116 
 
A. Ineffective Juries 
 
One of the most striking effects of jury exclusion is the racial disparity 
created in jury representation of minorities. A current theory is that felon 
exclusion reduces the participation of black males on juries by 
approximately thirty percent.117 With the criminal justice system 
overseeing a quarter to a third of the black male population,118 the 
exclusion of such a high number of black males raises the question of 
whether black defendants truly receive a jury composed of a “cross-
section” of their peers.119 In fact, one scholar suggests that felon exclusion 
is often used as a form of racial discrimination against blacks to 
purposefully exclude them from juries where they may be sympathetic to 
black defendants.120 
Lack of black juror representation on juries trying black defendants is 
particularly dangerous in light of racial bias among white jurors.121 The 
promise of an impartial jury can scarcely be upheld if the majority of 
people trying a defendant may hold conscious or unconscious bias against 
the defendant.122 In order for the large number of black defendants in the 
criminal justice system to receive fair trials, there must be an increased 
presence of black males in the jury pool.123 In accord with this concept, the 
American Bar Association has highlighted the importance of a jury that 
represents the population rather than upholding the tradition excluding 
felons from juries.124 
 
116. Id. 
117. Kalt, supra note 9, at 113-14. 
118. See supra note 54 and accompanying text. 
119. See supra notes 26-39 and accompanying text.  
120. Roberts, supra note 115, at 602-05. 
121. See supra notes 12-15 and accompanying text. Roberts, supra note 115, at 604 (noting 
studies that show that the whiter the jury, the more likely it is to convict people of color).  
122. See supra notes 13-14 and accompanying text. 
123. S. David Mitchell, Undermining Individual and Collective Citizenship: The Impact of 
Exclusion Laws on the African-American Community, 34 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 833, 858 (2007). The 
author notes that the Supreme Court in Batson stated that proportional representation is not necessary 
to create a fair jury, but the lack of peers in a potential pool of jurors creates such a great bias against a 
defendant that even voir dire would be incapable of creating a fair jury. Id. 
124. Segal, supra note 90, at 326-27 (citing American Bar Ass'n, The ABA Principles for Juries 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol57/iss1/17
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Categorically excluding large numbers of potential jurors based on past 
felony convictions also creates the risk of hindering juries in delivering 
informed, unbiased, and well-reasoned verdicts.125 Diversity of experience 
has the power to shape the jury’s interpretation of events, and felons have 
a unique experience to bring to the jury.126 For a jury that is tasked with 
judging criminal matters, felons who have knowledge of the workings of 
the criminal justice system have the potential to provide unique insight 
that would otherwise be inaccessible to laypersons.127 Former felons, for 
example, could inform unaware jurors about the plea bargaining process 
and the pressure put on defendants to make a guilty plea even in the 
absence of guilt.128 
 
B. Ineffective Reintegration 
 
Felon exclusion also serves to thwart society’s purported goal to 
reintegrate felons back into society upon release from confinement.129 The 
 
and Jury Trials 8 (2004), http://www.abanet.org/juryprojectstandards/The_ABA_Principles_for_ 
Juries_and 
_Jury_Trials.pdf). The ABA recommended that “only those who have been convicted of a felony 
and are in actual confinement or on probation, parole, or other court supervision be excluded.” Segal, 
supra note 90, at 326-27. 
125. See Roberts, supra note 115, at 605-07.   
126. Roberts, supra note 115, at 605-07.   
127. Roberts, supra note 115, at 605-07.   
128. Roberts, supra note 115, at 605-07.  Further examples of the perspective felons could 
potentially bring to juries include: understanding forced confessions and why a defendant would admit 
guilt if he was innocent and coming to terms with corruption among police and prosecutors. Roberts, 
supra note 115, at 605-07.   
129. Roberts, supra note 115, at 610. The author differentiates between reentry and 
reintegration. She quotes Michael Pinard in saying that:  
The terms ‘reentry’ and ‘reintegration’ tend to be used interchangeably in this context. 
However, some have observed these to be distinct concepts. For instance, one commentator 
observes that reentry is the process by which an ex-offender leaves confinement and returns 
to his or her community, while reintegration is the ultimate goal. 
Michael Pinard, Broadening the Holistic Mindset: Incorporating Collateral Consequences and 
Reentry into Criminal Defense Lawyering, 31 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1067, 1084 n.71 (2004)(citing 
Jeremy Travis, Address at the University of Maryland School of Law (Sept. 8, 2003)). Kutz notes the 
paradox between having both a social goal of reintegration and policies for exclusion: “The rationale 
for the exclusion of felons from juries stems from the belief that felons are less trustworthy and would 
be unable to administer the law fairly. However, this view is inconsistent with the idea of reintegration 
and rehabilitation, both of which are interests of the state.” Amanda L. Kutz, A Jury of One's Peers: 
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hindrance to reintegration is two-fold: (1) removing felons from civic 
participation and (2) sending negative messages about individuals who are 
excluded because of a felony conviction.130 By removing opportunities to 
participate in civic processes such as jury service, felons may be 
discouraged in their attempts to reclaim their role in society and may 
withdraw back into an anti-social life of crime.131 Further, excluding 
felons from jury service also sends a message o the felon being an outsider 
who does not belong.132 Such a message can be antithetical to the goal of 
making felons feel welcome in society and also reinforces the attitude 
amongst citizens that former felons should be treated as “others.”133  
 
C. The Promise of Civic Participation 
 
Felons stand to benefit greatly and would have a higher chance of 
successful reintegration if we remove barriers to jury inclusion.134 The 
value of jury service for citizens is tri-fold: it is educative, democratic, and 
allows for dialogue.135 In particular, serving on a jury “teaches jurors about 
life and law, engages them in self-government, and forces them into a 
serious civic interchange with their fellows.”136 By serving on a jury, 
felons would learn first-hand lessons about real-life conflicts, equity, and 
how democratic systems are intended to work.137 Jury service would make 
 
Virginia's Restoration of Rights Process and Its Disproportionate Effect on the African American 
Community, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2109, 2135 (2005). 
130. See Roberts, supra note 115, at 610. 
131. Jeremy Travis et al., Prisoner Reentry: Issues for Practice and Policy, 17 CRIM. JUST. 12, 
17 (2002). 
132. See Roberts, supra note 115, at 611. 
133. Roberts, supra note 115, at 611-12. Roberts says that for this reason, “legislation in this 
area plays a part in confirming anti-reintegrative stereotypes rather than seizing the opportunity to shift 
prejudices by showing people in a new role: that of civic participant.” Roberts, supra note 115, at 613. 
134. See Kalt, supra note 9, at 128-30. “In 2006, a Colorado court reasoned that a state statute 
that allowed those with felony-conviction histories to serve on petit juries was rationally related to the 
legislative purpose of rehabilitating convicted felons and reintegrating them into society once their 
punishment was complete.” Segal, supra note 90, at 326 (citing People v. Ellis, 148 P.3d 205, 210 
(Colo. App. 2006)). 
135. Kalt, supra note 9 at 128-30. 
136. Id. at 324; see also Kalt, supra note 9, at 128-30; see also Roberts, supra note 115, at 611 
(noting that “One of the types of activity that has been found to aid the possibility of reentry is civic 
participation.”). 
137. See Kalt, supra note 9, at 128-29. Kalt pulls these ideas from Alexis de Tocqueville’s 
description of the American jury system as “a gratuitous public school”. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, 
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felons full participants in the democratic process by allowing them to  
make a difference in their community and promote greater respect for the 
criminal justice system.138 Finally, felons serving on juries would also help 
facilitate a dialogue between jurors that could lead to the enhanced 
effectiveness of the jury139 and expose felons to viewpoints that are 
different from their own.140  
 
D. Outdated Justifications 
 
The most common argument against felon inclusion is that those 
convicted of felonies will destroy the probity of the jury.141 Yet, the 
inclusion of non-felons with “bad” character belies the argument that felon 
exclusion is effective in keeping out “bad” apples.142 It is a fair assumption 
that non-felon, “bad apple” jurors exist and have just as much potential to 
affect probity as former felons. Thus, there is a serious question of 
whether jury exclusion necessarily maintains probity. In the instance that 
we doubt this connection, the probity justification seemingly fails.143  
Bias is also often asserted in opposition to including felons on juries.144 
Yet, these assertions fail to take into account the fact that bias is present in 
other potential jurors,145 the system is procedurally designed to weed out 
such bias,146 and attributing negative feelings towards the justice system to 
 
DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 226-27 (Bruce Frohnen ed., Henry Reeve trans., Anchor Books 
2002)(1835). 
138. See Kalt, supra note 9, at 128-29. “There is modern empirical evidence suggesting that 
people who have served on juries believe that they have benefited from that service and that they have 
more respect for the courts than people who have not served on juries.” See Segal, supra note 90, at 
326 (citing Ellen E. Sward, Justification and Doctrinal Evolution, 37 CONN. L. REV. 389, 467 (2004)). 
139. See supra notes 126-128 and accompanying text. 
140. See Kalt, supra note 9, at 128-29. Kalt espouses the idea that felons who serve on juries 
will encounter a variety of people that will look at the world differently and will learn to work with 
people from varying backgrounds. Kalt, supra note 9, at 128-29. 
141. See Kalt, supra note 9, at 102-04. See supra notes 88-89 and accompanying text. 
142. See Kalt, supra note 9, at 102-04. See supra note 89 and accompanying text. 
143. See supra note 89 and accompanying text. 
144. See supra note 92 and accompanying text. 
145. See supra notes 94-96 and accompanying text. 
146. See Kalt, supra note 9, at 111-16. Kalt asserts that voir dire is designed to allow litigators 
to get at potential juror bias and uncover events in the juror’s background that would taint their ability 
to be impartial. Kalt, supra note 9, at 112-13. 
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every felon is a gross overgeneralization.147 As evidence that all felons are 
not biased, Kalt references court cases such as Boney, Humphreys, and 
Miller, in which courts upheld defendants’ convictions despite challenging 
their convictions on the basis of having had a felon on their respective 
juries.148 The courts in these cases all emphasized that as long as the felon 
juror was impartial and did not exhibit bias against the defendant, the 
verdict did not warrant overturning.149 If multiple courts can find that all 
felons are not biased and individual determination of their fitness for jury 
service is warranted, then other jurisdictions should be capable of such an 




The common law referred to the collateral consequences of criminal 
conviction as “civil death” for a reason. Excluding felons from juries 
based on notions of jury integrity and unsupported felon typecasting only 
results in irreversible harm to those subject to the criminal justice system, 
their communities, and society at large. Society would benefit more if we 
found a way to incorporate felons into the jury process, and henceforth the 
criminal justice system, in a positive rather than negative manner. This 
would serve to maximize the effectiveness of the jury, facilitate the reentry 
of felons into society, and increase trust in the criminal justice system.  
One way to reduce recidivism and correct behaviors that harm society 
is to rehabilitate offenders.150 True rehabilitation, however, would require 
felons to transition back into a society that treats them as individuals 
capable of being judged on their own merits rather than being limited by a 
state-imposed status. It would also be dependent upon opportunities being 
provided for those felons to learn and exhibit behaviors of an active 
citizen.151 Jury inclusion would serve these purposes as well as create a 
 
147. See Kalt, supra note 9, at 75. 
148. See supra notes 102-108 and accompanying text. 
149. See supra notes 102-108 and accompanying text. 
150. James Gilligan, Opinion, Punishment Fails. Rehabilitation Works. N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 19, 
2012), http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2012/12/18/prison-could-be-productive/punishment-
fails-reha 
bilitation-works. He espouses the idea that people learn by example so we will best help them 
transition back into society by helping them change their behavior to something that is constructive. 
151. See Kalt, supra note 9, at 128-30.  
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2018]  Justice in the Jury 247 
 
 
reason for felons to be invested in an equitable criminal justice system and 
a prospering community. 
Because of juror bias, discriminatory exclusion of minorities from 
juries, and flaws in other areas of the selection process, many members of 
the community have developed distrust for the criminal justice system and 
the jury in particular.152 For blacks especially, a long history of exclusion 
creates a feeling of being both closed out of the process and victimized by 
those who are allowed in.153 To remedy the defects in the jury and increase 
community confidence in our system, we should seek out sources to add 
diversity of race, culture, and experiences to juries that adequately 
represent the communities from which they are selected. Felon inclusion 
would support this by introducing a large number of blacks that are 
currently excluded because of their criminal records. This change would 
not only provide unique insight into the workings of the system, but it 
would increase fairness for minorities and those who are being judged by 
panels.  
While concerns rightfully exist about felons tainting the decision-
making process or affecting the integrity of the jury, it must be kept in 
mind that the same concerns exist with citizens who are non-felons. Every 
day there are people who are biased, prejudiced, or deficient in moral fiber 
that serve on juries. If we trust the juror selection process to choose 
between the biases of non-felons, we can likewise trust it to screen felons 
who may, in quite a few cases, have fewer biases than these non-felons.  
Felons should thus be included in the jury process to the greatest extent 
possible. However, because they are a heavily stigmatized population, 
their inclusion warrants the creation of a special system that would strike a 
balance between addressing the concerns of critics, while protecting 
former felons’ right not to be discriminated against because of status. First, 
felons should be allowed to go through voir dire in the same manner as 
non-felons. They should be asked the same questions with the exception of 
one;154 neither side in the case will be allowed to ask if the person has a 
 
152. See ALEXANDER, supra note 76 and accompanying text; see also Underwood, supra note 
68 at 748-49. 
153. See ALEXANDER, supra note 76 and accompanying text. 
154. Sample questions include the following:  
If you were my client, would you be completely comfortable having you as a juror on this 
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criminal record. This would allow parties to screen for bias or issues in the 
person’s background that hinders impartiality, but it would not 
disadvantage him because of a criminal background. Criminal convictions 
would only be revealed if the individual were selected to be on the jury 
panel. Then, the judge will consider the nature of the person’s crime and 
the actions at issue in the trial and strike the juror for cause only if he finds 
there is serious potential for bias or prejudice against either side in the 
case. 
To guard against any leaks of a criminal conviction to counselors 
conducting voir dire, judges would highly scrutinize any peremptory 
challenges. Judges would only be allowed to dismiss a potential juror if 
litigators can articulate a legitimate barrier to the person being an unbiased 
juror, and the judge would hold the prosecutors to a standard higher than 
that of Batson.155 Prosecutors would have to articulate a reason for striking 
the felon that is not just plausible, but also persuasive. This would be one 
of the only guarantees that prosecutors would not use current “race 
neutral” language to justify strikes that are in fact racially 
discriminatory.156  
If prosecutors or other court officials protest that too much leniency is 
provided to felons at the expense of protections for the jury system, one 
could easily point to multiple facets of the proposed process that provide 
continued safeguards against bias or prejudice. First, the voir dire process 
would continue to work in the exact same manner and would presumably 
weed out any bias that is a result of the person’s character or perspective. 
If the person is chosen, it can be assumed that there is no blatant prejudice, 
so felon status should not have been relevant. Second, the judge-conducted 
 
case? Can you think of anything in your own life that reminds you of this case?  What and 
how? Is there anything that you have seen or heard that would make it hard for you to 
guarantee to judge my client the same as the other side? Is there anything you’d prefer to 
discuss in private? Is there anything we haven’t asked you that you think we should know? 
5 Questions to Ask in Voir Dire . . . Always, THE LITIGATION CONSULTING REPORT (July 12, 2013), 
http://www.a2lc.com/blog/bid/66094/5-Questions-to-Ask-in-Voir-Dire-Always. These questions 
would serve the interest discussed below of screening for jury bias and impartiality.  
155. See supra notes 75-76 and accompanying text. As discussed above, the plausible standard 
allows for prosecutors to articulate even the most trivial reasons to strike a juror, and courts will 
uphold the prosecutor’s discretion if the true reason was discriminatory. Using a persuasive standard 
would prevent such abuses.  
156. See ALEXANDER, supra note 76 and accompanying text. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol57/iss1/17










2018]  Justice in the Jury 249 
 
 
review process for felons would ensure that any bias resulting from the 
nature of the felon’s conviction would be adequately assessed and the 
potential juror could be excluded if the judge thought it was necessary on 
the basis of the past felony conviction. With this multi-layered process, 
litigators could still use their normal methods of selection but be ensured 




Felons deserve the right to participate in the voir dire process with the 
rest of society. If we as a democracy want to further the goals of 
citizenship, self-development, and a fair criminal justice system, former 
felon inclusion in jury service is not just recommended, but critical.157 We 
must allow these individuals to go through the jury selection process in a 
manner similar to other individuals because it increases diversity, ensures 
more impartiality and less bias, and serves the goal of reintegration of 
felons back into society.158  
Further, felon inclusion works to secure the promise of our justice 
system that all criminal defendants will be tried by an impartial jury.159 
Impartiality is difficult to obtain if individuals are denied a panel of their 
peers based on race, sex, religion, or other indicators unrelated to a 
potential juror’ fitness for jury service.160 Felons, as much as other groups, 
have a distinct perspective and story to bring to juries and can learn a great 
deal from their jury experiences.161 If we want our criminal justice system 
to work for us, including these individuals needs to become a priority. 
 
 
157. See Kalt, supra note 9. 
158. See Roberts, supra note 115. 
159. See Segal, supra note 90. 
160. See Segal, supra note 90. 
161. See Kalt, supra note 9. 
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